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Criminal Law in Crisis 
Benjamin Levin* 
Introduction 
On April 5, 2020, Michael Tyson, a 53-year old man arrested for a technical 
parole-violation, became the first reported person on Rikers Island to die from 
COVID-19.1  By April 20, over two-thirds of  the people incarcerated in Ohio’s 
Mario Correctional Institution had tested positive for the novel coronavirus, and 
over twenty percent of  Ohio’s 12,919 confirmed cases had been traced to the 
state’s prison system.2  By April 30, prisons or jails had been identified as the 
source of  eight out of  ten of  largest viral clusters in the United States.3 
Advocates sprang to action:  They called for governors to use clemency, 
pardon, and furlough powers;4 they petitioned judges to release defendants 
awaiting trial;5 they called on police to issue citations instead of  arresting 
individuals;6 and they implored prosecutors to drop charges or seek non-carceral 
alternatives when they did prosecute as a way to reduce the risk of  exposing 
 
* Associate Professor, University of  Colorado Law School.  For helpful comments and 
conversations, thanks to Jenny Braun, Jessica Eaglin, and Joan Segal.  Many thanks as well to 
Francis Kailey, Quentin Morse, and the other editors of  the Colorado Law Review for their 
thoughtful engagement and assistance. 
1 See Joshua Bates, New York’s Rikers Island Jail Sees First Inmate Death From COVID-19, TIME 
(Apr. 6, 2020), https://time.com/5816332/rikers-island-inmate-dies-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/4BJ9-8ZGX]. 
2 See Bill Chappell, 73% Of Inmates At An Ohio Prison Test Positive For Coronavirus, NPR (Apr. 20, 
2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/04/20/838943211/73-
of-inmates-at-an-ohio-prison-test-positive-for-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/4BJ9-8ZGX]. 
3 See Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-us-cases.html 
[https://perma.cc/9N3V-56TZ] (permalink contains data as of Aug. 1, 2020). 
4 See, e.g., Rachel Barkow, Our Leaders Have the Power to Release People in Prison. Now They Must Use 
It., THE APPEAL, Mar. 27, 2020, https://theappeal.org/coronavirus-prison-commutations; 
James King, A Plea to Governor Newsom: Don’t Abandon Elderly Incarcerated People to Die From 
COVID-19, THE APPEAL (Mar. 30, 2020), https://theappeal.org/gavin-newsom-california-
prisons-coronavirus-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/SZA4-A3QK]. 
5 See, e.g., Disability Rights Mont. v. Mont. Jud. Dists. 1-22, OP 20-0189, 2020 WL 1867123, at 
*1 (Mont. Apr. 14, 2020);  Comm. for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of Trial Court, SJC-
12926, 2020 WL 2027846 (Mass. Apr. 28, 2020); Deborah Becker, Mass. High Court Rules Some 
Prisoners Will Be Eligible For Release Due To COVID-19, WBUR-FM (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://www.wbur.org/news/2020/04/03/sjc-prisoners-emergency-petition-ruling 
[https://perma.cc/7LL7-637T]. 
6 See, e.g., Police Responses to Covid-19, BRENNAN CTR. (Mar. 27, 2020), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/police-responses-covid-19 
[https://perma.cc/U4WJ-RXD7]. 
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more people to the deadly virus.7 
The arguments offered were simple and compelling: the combination of  a 
deadly virus and the U.S. criminal system presented a humanitarian crisis.8  
Criminal justice reform, decarceration, or abolition—all causes that had gained 
ground in recent years9—suddenly seemed more urgent.  Addressing the 
massive and metastasized carceral state was not only the right thing to do; it 
might be the only way to save the lives of  2.3 million incarcerated people and 
countless others who work in, live near, or interact with the carceral system.10 
This exceptional situation and crisis mentality offer an important 
opportunity to reexamine the hardships experienced by people affected by the 
criminal system and potentially to save lives in the process.11  But, they also offer 
an important opportunity to recognize the cruelty, inhumanity, and 
destructiveness that define U.S. criminal policy even in “normal” times.  That is, 
so many of  the most shocking aspects of  criminal law’s administration during 
the pandemic are actually extensions of  problems that plague the system in 
“normal” times.12 
In this Essay, I offer a brief  account of  how the pandemic lays bare the 
structural flaws of  the carceral state and the contemporary realities of  the 
criminal system.  I provide two primary examples or illustrations, but they are 
 
7 See, e.g., Rebecca Klar, Brooklyn DA Says His Office Won’t Prosecute Some Low-Level Offenses amid 
Coronavirus Outbreak, THE HILL (Mar. 17, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-
watch/487987-brooklyn-da-says-his-office-wont-prosecute-some-low-level-offenses-amid 
[https://perma.cc/N4RY-QD5C]. 
8 See Sharon Dolovich, Every Public Official With The Power To Decarcerate Must Exercise That Power 
Now, THE APPEAL (Apr. 10, 2020), https://theappeal.org/every-public-official-with-the-
power-to-decarcerate-must-exercise-that-power-now/ [https://perma.cc/9KQV-VU4R]; Alice 
Speri, Mass Incarceration Poses a Uniquely American Risk in the Coronavirus Pandemic, THE INTERCEPT 
(May 6, 2020), https://interc.pt/2WanYwE [https://perma.cc/2EXV-WBNL].  
9 See Douglas Husak, The Price of Criminal Law Skepticism: Ten Functions of the Criminal Law, 23 
NEW CRIM. L. REV. 27, 29 (2020); see also Introduction, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1568 (2019); see also 
Rachel Kushner, Is Prison Necessary? Ruth Wilson Gilmore Might Change Your Mind, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/17/magazine/prison-abolition-ruth-
wilson-gilmore.html [ https://perma.cc/V7VQ-R9VW]; see generally Benjamin Levin, The 
Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 117 MICH. L. REV. 259 (2018); see also Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Foreword: Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (2019). 
10 See Ed Pilkington, Mass Incarceration Could Add 100,000 Deaths to US Coronavirus Toll, Study 
Finds, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2020/apr/22/coronavirus-us-jails-incarceration-death-toll-study 
[https://perma.cc/U49W-UF4L]. 
11 Cf. STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND 
ORDER xv (1978) (“Resolutions to the crisis can take different forms; there is no preordained 
result.”). 
12 See generally Jenny E. Carroll, Pretrial Detention in the Time of COVID-19, NW. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020), permanently available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576163. 
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not meant to serve as an exhaustive list.  Rather, by highlighting these issues, 
problems, or—perhaps—features, I mean to push back on claims of  
exceptionalism and to suggest that this moment of  crisis should serve not just 
as an opportunity to marshal resources to address the pandemic, but also as a 
chance to address the harsh realities of  the U.S. criminal system.13  Further, my 
claim is not that criminal law is in some way unusual in this respect (i.e., similar 
observations certainly could be and have been made about the health-
care/insurance system, the tethering of  social benefits to employment, pervasive 
inequality, and many other features of  U.S. political economy).14  Nevertheless, 
the current moment provides an opportunity to appreciate the ways in which 
many particularly problematic aspects of  criminal law in crisis are basic features 
of  the U.S. carceral state.15 
To this end, my argument proceeds in two Parts, each addressing one of  the 
aspects or pathologies of  U.S. criminal policy that the pandemic has exacerbated.  
In Part I, I address the absence of  “sentencing realism” or, perhaps more 
accurately, the failure to consider the reality of  jails and prisons when imposing 
sentences or pretrial detention.  In Part II, I address the basic limitations of  
thinking of  “the criminal system” as a “system.”  What do commentators and 
lawmakers miss when they suggest or assume that criminal law and its 
administration are the same in a rural county in Colorado as in an urban county 
in New York?  What is lost in treatments of  criminal law and punishment that 
assume a generally applicable and coherent sets of  policies, practices, and 
justifications?   
In each Part, I explain how the pandemic has made each phenomenon easier 
to identify, but also how each phenomenon defined the criminal system in pre-
COVID-19 days.  Ultimately, I argue that the “crisis” frame provides an 
opportunity for reform, but also risks obscuring the ways in which the criminal 
system was in crisis long before the first COVID-19 tests came back positive. 
 
13 See id. at 3 (“In many ways, the current COVID-19 crisis has revealed a criminal justice 
system that was always broken and always teetered on the edge of some disaster.”). 
14 See generally Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Coronavirus and the Politics of Disposability, BOSTON REVIEW 
(Apr. 8, 2020), http://bostonreview.net/class-inequality-race-politics/shaun-ossei-owusu-
coronavirus-and-politics-disposability [https://perma.cc/6RBM-YAWU] (arguing that the 
pandemic highlights longstanding structural inequality). 
15 See Derecka Purnell, Coronavirus has Shown that it is Possible to Change the US Criminal Justice 
System, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/07/criminal-justice-system-us-
coronavirus-shown-possible-to-change [https://perma.cc/2Q75-YKKD]. 
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I. Sentencing Realism 
In late April, as the number of  COVID-19 cases linked to jails and prisons 
grew, the New York Times editorial board called on officials to take action to 
release incarcerated people and declared that “no one deserves to die of  Covid-
19 in prison or jail.”16  The Times was not the first place these arguments had 
surfaced.  Commentators frequently described jails as “petri dishes” and stressed 
the absence of  soap or hand sanitizer.17  Indeed, even though people in New 
York state prisons were put to work in March producing hand sanitizer, they 
were not actually allowed to possess sanitizer in their cells.18  (New York has 
since joined twenty-nine other states in allowing hand sanitizer; the remaining 
twenty states still treat hand sanitizer as prison contraband in most or all cases).19  
Advocates and officials had come to accept the logic of  decarceration: any 
decision to put a person in a cage was a decision to risk exposing them to the 
virus.20 
The shift in perspective was a significant one in that it framed punishment 
not simply in terms of  days, weeks, months, or years, but rather in terms of  what 
punishment actually would look like.  In this respect, the pandemic frame allowed a 
 
16 Editorial, No One Deserves to Die of Covid-19 in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/opinion/coronavirus-prisons.html?smid=tw-share 
[https://perma.cc/N4B7-2XDE]. 
17 E.g., Jonathan Capehart, Opinion, ‘No Such Thing as Social Distancing’ When You’re Incarcerated, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/31/no-
such-thing-social-distancing-when-youre-incarcerated/ [https://perma.cc/DB3H-7WT2]; 
Timothy Williams et al., ‘Jails Are Petri Dishes’: Inmates Freed as the Virus Spreads Behind Bars, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/us/coronavirus-prisons-
jails.html [https://perma.cc/AN7K-D4JP]; Holly Yan, Prisons and Jails across the US are Turning 
into ‘Petri Dishes’ for Coronavirus.  Deputies are Falling Ill, Too., CNN (Apr. 10, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/09/us/coronavirus-jails-prisons/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/44V8-Y7LT]. 
18 Antonia Noori Farzan, Inmates are Manufacturing Hand Sanitizer to Help Fight Coronavirus. But 
Will They Be Allowed to Use It?, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/03/10/hand-sanitizer-prison-labor/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y8AB-7LYS]. 
19 Casey Tolan, Hand Sanitizer Is Still Considered Contraband in Some Prisons around the Country, 
CNN (May 5, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/05/us/coronavirus-prison-hand-
sanitizer-contraband-invs/index.html [https://perma.cc/8D6G-3QET]. 
20 See Emma Grey Ellis, Covid-19 Poses a Heightened Threat in Jails and Prisons, WIRED (Mar. 24, 
2020), https://www.wired.com/story/coronavirus-covid-19-jails-prisons/ 
[https://perma.cc/W2K5-QWCA]; Brent Orrell & Grant Duwe, COVID-19 has Exposed the 
Interlocking Risks of Mass Incarceration, THE HILL (Apr. 30, 2020) 
https://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/495547-covid-19-has-exposed-the-interlocking-
risks-of-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/R7DD-5BFA]; Tony Saavedra, Early Release 
Begins in Orange County Jails after More than 100 Inmates Exposed to Coronavirus, ORANGE CNTY. 
REGISTER (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.ocregister.com/2020/03/27/early-release-begins-in-
orange-county-jails-after-hundreds-of-inmates-exposed-to-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/BS25-UR7P]. 
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departure from business as usual.  As Eve Hanan has argued, prisons are 
frequently “invisible” is the administration of  criminal punishment and its 
study.21 
When judges impose carceral sentences on defendants, they rarely speak in 
terms of  the conditions of  confinement that a defendant will face.22  Further, in 
both state and federal systems, judges do not actually have the authority to 
sentence a defendant to a specific jail or prison.23  A federal defendant sentenced 
to a carceral term in her home state might have a very different experience than 
a defendant who is assigned to a prison across the country.24  Incarceration in a 
distant state (or distant corner of  a defendant’s home state) might reduce 
dramatically the likelihood that friends and family can visit, might exacerbate 
racial or cultural differences between the defendant and prison staff, and might 
make the process of  re-entry on the back-end even more difficult.25  Similarly, 
being sent by the state department of  corrections or the Federal Bureau of  
Prisons to a facility with a reputation for violence, abuse, or unsanitary 
conditions might look very different than being sent to a prison with many 
educational and job training programs and a reformist warden.26  And individual 
characteristics of  a defendant (e.g., race, class, sexuality, mental health) might 
 
21 See generally M. Eve Hanan, Invisible Prisons, UC DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript on file with author). 
22 Alice Ristroph has suggested that the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment proportionality 
jurisprudence might provide some avenue for changing this practice and importing more 
realism into the sentencing process.  See Alice Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment, and the Constitution, 
23 FED. SENT. R. 75, 77 (2010) (“Graham thus suggests that to assess the severity of a prison 
sentence, one must give some consideration to the prisoner's subjective experience. It is not 
enough to consult the calendar and count years.”). 
23 Cf., e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245–46 (1983) (holding that bureaucrats 
deciding to transfer an inmate to another state’s prison does not deprive the inmate of a liberty 
interest under the Due Process Clause) (an inmate has “no justifiable expectation that he will 
be incarcerated in any particular prison” or “in any particular state.”); see also Adam J. Kolber, 
The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 195 (2009) (“Sentencing 
decisions are usually made by judges while decisions about conditions of incarceration are 
usually made by prison bureaucrats (under conditions that are generally less open, accountable, 
and reviewable than they are in the courtroom). Judges can recommend prison assignments, 
but at least in the federal system, the Bureau of Prisons is under no obligation to follow their 
recommendations.”). 
24 See generally Benjamin Levin, Inmates for Rent, Sovereignty for Sale: The Global Prison Market, 23 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 509 (2014). 
25 See, e.g., id.; Emma Kaufman, The Prisoner Trade, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1856 (2020); 
Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 601 (2006) 
(noting specific challenges faced by incarcerated parents separated from their children by long 
distances). 
26 See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 25, at 1833 n.102; see also Levin, supra note 24. 
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dramatically alter her experience of  incarceration.27 
The lack of  inquiry into the circumstances of  incarceration is not confined 
to the sentencing phase or to the post-guilt stages of  the criminal process.28  
When a judge determines that a defendant should be detained pretrial or held 
on unrealistically high bail, she generally does not make a finding on the record 
about the actual conditions of  confinement that the defendant will face or the 
impact on her life, health, or safety that this period of  incarceration will have.29  
Indeed, despite the Supreme Court’s insistence that pretrial detention is not 
punishment and is somehow practically and conceptually distinct from post-
conviction incarceration,30 the same jails house individuals charged with crimes 
alongside people convicted of  crimes.31  And, some accounts suggest that the 
conditions faced by people detained pretrial in jails often may be harsher than 
those faced by individuals convicted and sentenced to terms in prison.32 
Put simply, a fundamental lack of  realism tends to define judges’ treatment 
of  decisions about when and for how long to incarcerate.  The decisions are 
framed as simply bimodal (i.e., incarceration or no incarceration) or in terms of  
duration, not quality or conditions.33   
The pandemic has shone a light on the heedlessness of  the decision-making 
process: when a judge sentences an immunocompromised defendant to a 
carceral term, she is not just deciding that this defendant should be segregated 
from society or should be denied a range of  basic liberties; rather, the judge has 
effectively decided that it is acceptable for the defendant to be exposed to a 
 
27 See, e.g., Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1301 (2011); David Gray, 
Punishment As Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1630 (2010); Kolber, supra note 23; E. Lea 
Johnston, Modifying Unjust Sentences, 49 GA. L. REV. 433, 443 (2015). 
28 For an account of how pretrial detention and its flawed doctrinal framework have operated 
during the pandemic, see generally Carroll, supra note 12. 
29 To learn about these conditions, see generally Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: 
Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1312–13 
(2012).  For a firsthand perspective on the experience of incarceration, see Mika’il DeVeaux, 
The Trauma of the Incarceration Experience, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 257 (2013). 
30 See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–52 (1987). 
31 See Appleman, supra note 29, at 1312–13 (“[P]retrial detainees are often incarcerated 
alongside the ten percent of convicted criminals who are housed in jails rather than prisons.  
This indicates that the holding conditions for pretrial detainees are, at minimum, punishment-
like, as it is precisely the same as that for some convicted offenders. The lines between prison 
and jail are becoming increasingly blurred, and not for the better.” (footnotes omitted)). 
32 See id.; Robert G. Lawson, Turning Jails Into Prisons—Collateral Damage from Kentucky's “War on 
Crime”, 95 KY. L.J. 1, 4-5, 24-25 (2007); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
1555, 1684-88 (2003). 
33 See generally Hanan, supra note 21. 
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potentially fatal illness.34  Similarly, a determination that a defendant should be 
detained pretrial for purposes of  “public safety” amounts to a determination 
that the potential risk of  violence to the community that the defendant poses is 
greater or clearly outweighs the risk that the defendant will get sick and die (or, 
of  course, that she will contract the virus and expose others to it once she is 
released).  As Jenny Carroll has argued compellingly, pretrial detention 
determinations during the pandemic have revealed the lack of  attention paid to 
“downstream consequences” during bail hearings.35 
A characterization of  sentencing and bail determinations during the 
pandemic that emphasizes the stakes and conditions of  incarceration strikes me 
as completely accurate.  But, importantly, this characterization also accurately 
describes how such determinations always work.  That is, on an average day in 
criminal court there is not a deadly virus wreaking havoc behind bars, but the 
incarcerated person may well face many challenges, hardships, or obstacles that 
the official description of  sentence (e.g., “sixty months’ imprisonment”) does 
not capture.36  What the pandemic reveals (or, perhaps, highlights), then, is the 
reality that these judicial determinations usually lack a firm grounding in the 
conditions of  confinement that actually define the incarcerated person’s time 
behind bars.37  Similarly, such determinations generally disregard collateral 
consequences and other hardships that the sentence will entail for the defendant, 
her family, and her community.38  In a legal system that purports to reject “cruel” 
punishments, it would be unseemly for a judge to sentence a defendant to serve 
time in a prison notorious for abuse if  the judge believed the defendant were 
particularly blameworthy.  But it also would be more honest, forcing society to 
face the reality of  criminal punishment and the actual scale of  its punitiveness.39 
 
34 To be clear, judges do not explicitly make such determinations on the record, but 
appreciating the impact of sentencing and bail determinations requires considering their social 
context. 
35 See Carroll, supra note 12, at 8. 
36 Cf. Karr v. State, 459 P.3d 1183, 1187–88 (Alaska Ct. App. 2020) (“At the hearing, the trial 
court shall conduct an individualized assessment to determine the least restrictive bail 
condition or conditions that will reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance in court and 
protect the victim, other people, and the community in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and 
any other new information that may be provided.”). 
37 See Carroll, supra note 12, at 8. 
38 See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2265, 2306 (2018); 
Sandra G. Mayson, Collateral Consequences and the Preventive State, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 301, 
303 (2015); Kevin R. Reitz, The Economic Rehabilitation of Offenders: Recommendations of the Model 
Penal Code (Second), 99 MINN. L. REV. 1735, 1754 (2015). 
39 Notably, in the literature on collateral consequences, scholars generally make this realist- or 
transparency-focused pitch—punishment includes more than just the term of incarceration, so 
judges should articulate those other terms, prosecutors and defense attorneys should consider 
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To appreciate whether punishment is proportional, whether the punishment 
fits the crime, etc., we should be able to understand what the punishment is.40  It 
matters whether the punishment amounts to a high likelihood of  exposure to 
COVID-19, a high likelihood of  rape, or a high likelihood that the incarcerated 
person will be able to take college courses.  These distinctions tell us what the 
punishment is.  And as a practical matter, the realities of  incarceration—more 
than simple classifications of  duration—should help us understand what it 
means to say that society has deemed it appropriate to incarcerate. 
II. Not One System, But Many 
The coronavirus also has driven home the importance of  the local (i.e., local 
politics, practices, institutions, and actors) in discussions of  criminal justice 
policy.  The essential questions for controlling the spread of  the virus behind 
bars tend to rely on local actors and micro decisions.  Although governors and 
legislators have substantial roles in exercising clemency power, redefining 
crimes, or setting limits on who should be incarcerated and for how long,41 how 
a jurisdiction deals with arrests, release, and jail management may be the results 
of  decisions by individual sheriffs, wardens, police chiefs, and district 
attorneys.42  In the context of  the pandemic, we have seen that different states, 
 
them at plea bargaining, and appellate judges should incorporate them into Eighth 
Amendment proportionality analysis.  See, e.g., A.B.A., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF 
CONVICTED PERSONS 1, 18 (3d ed. 2004); Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking 
Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1825 (2012); Eisha Jain, 
Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1210 (2016); Margaret Colgate Love, 
Managing Collateral Consequences in the Sentencing Process: The Revised Sentencing Articles of the Model 
Penal Code, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 247, 263 (2015). 
40 See, e.g., Chin, supra, note 39, at 1825; Levin, supra note 38, at 2306; Mayson, supra note 38, at 
303.  Cf. Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 6 
(2010) (arguing that criminal law operates to redistribute pain from the victim to the offender). 
41 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 4; John Herrick, Colorado Places a Moratorium on New Prison Intakes 
During Pandemic, COLO. INDEP. (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.coloradoindependent.com/2020/03/26/colorado-moratorium-prisons-inmates-
covid-19-cspii/ [https://perma.cc/V7XF-XLND]; Matt McKinney, Gov. Tom Wolf to 
Temporarily Release Pa. State Inmates amid Coronavirus Crisis as Legislative Effort Falls Apart, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (Apr. 10, 2010), https://www.inquirer.com/health/coronavirus/spl/pennsylvania-
coronavirus-state-prison-reprieves-1800-inmates-20200410.html [https://perma.cc/8P5E-
D3SP]. 
42 See, e.g., Jessica Pishko, What Sheriffs Can Do To Slow the Coronavirus Outbreak, THE APPEAL 
(Mar. 18, 2020), https://theappeal.org/what-sheriffs-can-do-to-slow-the-coronavirus-
outbreak/ [https://perma.cc/MW32-P3U6]; Juliana Feliciano Reyes, Philly Jail Workers Want 
Judges to Release More Inmates Because of Coronavirus, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Apr. 22, 2020), 
https://www.inquirer.com/jobs/labor/coronavirus-philadelphia-prisons-reduce-jail-
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counties, and municipalities adopt disparate approaches to the crisis; such 
differences reflect the ways in which criminal policy often is made on the retail, 
rather than wholesale level. 
For example, jail population data reflect different approaches by 
prosecutors, judges, sheriffs, and police chiefs seeking to stem the tide of  the 
virus.  Between early March and mid-April, the jail population in Denver, 
Colorado shrank 41%,43 the jail population in Washington D.C. declined by 
21%,44 and the number of  people incarcerated in Mobile Alabama’s Metro Jail 
decreased by 30%.45  State prisons reflect a similarly varied story.  Some states, 
like Michigan and Wisconsin, took drastic action, ramping up parole grants and 
compassionate releases;46 others, like Kansas and Oklahoma, moved much more 
slowly, identifying high risk individuals, but only releasing a small percentage of  
them.47  Even different probation departments took different tacks: in mid-
March, Arkansas, Nevada, New York, and Rhode Island all suspended in-person 
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threa/ [https://perma.cc/M233-8S8J]. 
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DETROIT FREE PRESS (Jun. 9, 2020), 
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probation and parole visit requirements, replacing them with phone, text, or 
online check-ins;48 California, on the other hand only suspended in-person visits 
for the elderly and immunocompromised.49  Put simply, the departures from 
“business as usual” (and the effects of  those departures) were hardly uniform 
across jurisdictions.  
Again, this lack of  uniformity is an important point in the pandemic context.  
But, it also is an insight that has been a staple of  criminal justice scholarship and 
advocacy over the past decade.50  Despite the generally accepted use of  “the 
criminal justice system” to describe the U.S. model of  administering criminal 
law, scholars increasingly have pushed back on the application or logic of  
systems theory.51  At the very least, they have suggested, the “criminal justice 
system” (whether it really deals with “justice” is another question)52 is not a 
single system; rather, it reflects an amalgam of  different “systems,” different 
political choices made by different political actors in different  contexts.53  In 
 
48 See Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, 
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49 See id.  In this Part and throughout, I am greatly indebted to the Prison Policy Initiative for 
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50 And, to be clear, much advocacy operates at the local level, so “the past decade” understates 
the ways in which many activists and reformers have been operating at the local level for much 
longer.   
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Garlock & Alexander Nabavi-Noori, Toward A Demosprudence of Poverty, 69 DUKE L.J. 1473, 
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the Boundaries of “Criminal Justice,” 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619, 619–20 (2018); Sara Mayeux, 
The Idea of “The Criminal Justice System,” 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 65 (2018). 
52 See, e.g., Bell, et al., supra note 51, at 1528 n. 7 (“We view “criminal legal system” as a more 
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and punishment. These institutions—criminal lawmaking, policing, courts, prison, probation, 
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53 See, e.g., VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC 
PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHES OFFENDERS 178 (2009); RACHEL ELISE 
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16 August 2020 Criminal Law in Crisis 11 
other words, it makes sense to say that the way to address COVID-19 on Rikers 
Island or in policing New York City might look different from the way  to 
address the pandemic in rural Colorado.  But, it also would make sense to say 
that the “criminal justice system” in New York City is not the same system as 
the one in Sterling, Colorado.54 
Further, media coverage and (until recently) legal scholarship tend to 
overstate the federal system and the role of  national criminal policy.55  In 
critiques of  mass incarceration, federal statutes and federal policies tend to take 
on outsized significance, even though the federal system represents a small 
percentage of  the U.S. carceral archipelago.56  Indeed, this is one explanation for 
why the War on Drugs is commonly viewed as the primary driver of  expanding 
prison populations; even though a minority of  incarcerated people are being 
held for drug offenses,57drug charges represent a much larger proportion of  
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States. . . is not a “system’ at all, but rather a chaotic swirl of local, county, state, and (less 
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crime rates vary dramatically borough to borough. 
55 See, e.g., John Pfaff, Bill Clinton is Wrong About His Crime Bill. So are the Protesters He Lectured, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/magazine/bill-clinton-is-
wrong-about-his-crime-bill-so-are-the-protesters-he-lectured.html [https://perma.cc/ZRD5-
N35D] (critiquing the overemphasis on federal statutes in discussions about mass 
incarceration).  There’s something to be said here about elite law schools and the 
pervasiveness of hierarchy in the legal academy—federal courts are more powerful and 
therefore “prestigious” than state ones, and clerkships at the federal level are a coin of the 
realm in gaining access to the legal professoriate.  So, on some level, it should not be 
surprising that federal laws and the federal system are treated as unduly important in academic 
discussions of criminal policy.  Of course, this pathology persists in the national media, which 
may mean that the forces at play are less those of legal elitism than simply those of general, 
versus specific, applicability—federal criminal policy affects all students, lawyers, readers, and 
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56 See generally Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON 
POLICY INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html 
[https://perma.cc/7EUE-RKR5]. 
57 See, e.g., JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK 
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federal cases than state cases, so focusing on the federal system allows for an 
exaggerated impression of  drug crime’s role.58  Similarly, this might be one 
reason why federal criminal justice reform efforts often are framed as though 
they would accomplish much more than they will, from President Obama’s 2016 
decision to end solitary confinement for juveniles in federal prisons (there were 
26 juveniles in federal custody at the time),59 to the First Step Act, passed with 
much fanfare during the Trump presidency, but critiqued by many as a quite-
tentative first step.60  This is not to say that federal policies do not matter, or that 
reforms at that level are not important to the hundreds of  thousands of  people 
charged or incarcerated in the federal system.  Rather, it is to say that describing 
the federal system as “the criminal justice system” would be a gross 
misstatement,61 and that the federal system is distinct from those of  the states 
in many ways. 
Framed differently, generalized characterizations of  a “criminal justice 
system” are always inaccurate.  As Sara Mayeux has argued, “reflexive 
invocations of  ‘the criminal justice system’ may hinder rather than facilitate 
thoughtful discussion of  the wide range of  topics generally subsumed under 
that terminological umbrella.”62  These characterizations and framings always 
presume a shared logic and a shared politics.  The pandemic reveals the ways in 
which such an understanding of  criminal law and its administration is misguided.  
Certainly, local politics are embedded in a broader political economy and cultural 
imagination.63  Nevertheless, the politics of  criminal law are local, and even when 
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YALE L.J. 1374, 1401 (2008). 
62 Mayeux, supra note 51, at 62. 
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the responses are national or statewide, the implementation generally relies on 
local realities.64  In the same way, resistance to criminal law and its enforcement 
tends to be centered at the local level, through activism, advocacy, and individual 
engagement. From the community group, to the bail fund, to the public 
defender’s office, the move to resist punishment relies not only on those looking 
at the system, but those looking to see the way that the law affects their friends 
and neighbors.65 
Conclusion: Crisis and its Limitations 
The pandemic is a crisis.  But what can this crisis, or perhaps more accurately 
this crisis frame, tell us about criminal law and its administration in the United 
States? 66  “Crisis is not objectively bad or good,” argues Ruth Wilson Gilmore 
in her seminal book Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in 
Globalizing California.67  “[R]ather, it signals systemic change whose outcome is 
determined through struggle.”68   
On the one hand, crisis and the attendant language of  urgency and 
exceptionality have been features of  movements to reform or transform the U.S. 
criminal system.  Constitutional litigation relies on narratives of  exceptionality—
the abuse at the hands of  police or guards must have passed some threshold of  
the mundane in order to trigger liability; the denials of  process or procedural 
protections to a defendant must not have been mere inconveniences or 
“harmless errors” for a conviction to be set aside.  So too do movements, 
advocacy, and activism.  Think here of  the resonance of  innocence stories and 
exonerations or even tales of  the “disproportionate” punishments leveled 
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against the three-strikes defendant who committed a minor offense (e.g., Gary 
Ewing’s life sentence for stealing three golf  clubs).69  In other words, the 
language of  crisis, disruption, and exceptionality provides a hook and a means 
of  shining light on the darkest corners of  criminal law.  It also allows for and 
often appears to necessitate an emergency response.   
On the other hand, crisis suggests that there are norms or, perhaps more 
accurately, a “normal,” which has been disrupted and which must be reinstated.70  
Such a frame, then, poses two risks for those hoping to dismantle the carceral 
state or transformi the way that U.S. criminal law operates.  First, suggesting that 
a particular crisis or set of  crisis conditions is exceptional risks legitimating the 
non-crisis conditions and accepting the desirability of  the old normal.71  Second, 
the language of  crisis and exception presupposes that we truly are witnessing 
exceptional circumstances or an exceptional case, that each story of  injustice, 
misconduct, abuse, or disease is an aberration, rather than a representation or 
manifestation of  structural and systemic pathologies.72  Indeed, part of  what 
makes exceptionality so appealing as a rhetorical advocacy strategy is its 
limitation—it allows the public, voters, or lawmakers to embrace reform or do 
justice without requiring them to confront larger structural problems.73 
The pandemic has exacerbated or laid bare flaws that already were very 
present.  And, as noted at the outset, the examples I provided are only examples.  
There are numerous other problematic aspects of  criminal law and policy that 
predated the pandemic but have been thrown into more stark relief: the 
tendency to use police or criminal law as the tools to control individual conduct 
(and the focus on individual misconduct, rather than structural problems);74 the 
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differential use of  criminal law to regulate communities based on differences of  
race, class, or social marginality;75 the impulse to exclude people from benefits 
or to impose additional punishments on them because of  their criminal 
records;76 the refusal to extend humane treatment or forgiveness to certain 
defendants because of  the kind of  crimes they committed (or are accused of);77 
the failure of  institutional actors to use their power to alleviate suffering;78 and 
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so on. 
Certainly, COVID-19 changes the stakes or the calculus from criminal law 
in “normal” times; the stakes of  criminal law always are extraordinarily high, but 
the virus raises many decisions to life-and-death.  And, this urgency might shift 
the political calculation for some academics, activists, and advocates: perhaps 
some who otherwise would adopt a narrow, pragmatic approach focusing only 
on “non-violent offenders” or easy cases now realize the immediate need to help 
less-sympathetic individuals or push for sweeping change.79  But, perhaps more 
radical actors who generally view the narrow approach as legitimating or 
somehow dangerous to a broader decarceral vision might embrace moderate or 
intermediate reforms more quickly in a world where time is of  the essence to 
save individual lives.80  Or, perhaps both.   
In many ways, criminal law is defined by crisis.  The language of  exceptional 
misbehavior justifies punishment, new laws, and new methods of  social 
control.81  The current pandemic provides a much-needed opportunity to 
reimagine that frame and consider the ways in which the institutions of  criminal 
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